How the new policy achieved what decades of proposals, including for a Lower Manhattan Expressway, could not.
Could a meaningful reduction in New York City’s traffic congestion finally be at hand? Assuming President Trump is unsuccessful in killing the promising congestion pricing program, some encouraging preliminary results following the implementation of the program this past January suggest that it might well be. More than one million fewer cars have entered the congestion zone compared to the same period last year and congestion has been eased throughout the zone. The results so far are especially striking and consequential in Lower Manhattan.
For more than a century, Lower Manhattan’s full potential has been hampered by traffic congestion so severe that it has defied all efforts by government, planners and business interests to make a dent in the problem.
In her thoughtful and provocative new book, “Movement: New York’s Long War To Take Back its Streets from the Car,” Nicole Gelinas provides a sweeping history of approaches to address the challenge of traffic congestion. Perhaps the most dramatic proposals were presented by a blue-chip group of New Yorkers in their 1929 “Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs.” Among their proposals were to build two expressways south of 60th Street: one, a tunnel underneath Midtown connecting the Lincoln Tunnel to the Queens Midtown Tunnel; the other, a 10-lane skyway, called the Lower Manhattan Expressway, or “Lomex,” looming above Canal Street, connecting the Holland Tunnel with the Williamsburg and Manhattan bridges.
It quickly became apparent that the price tag for a tunnel under Midtown was exorbitant and infeasible. But the Lower Manhattan Expressway above Canal Street was enthusiastically embraced by a broad cross-section of business leaders, including David Rockefeller, then head of Chase Bank; business associations, including the Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association and the Real Estate Board; civic groups such as the Regional Plan Association; editorial boards, including the New York Times; and many elected officials, including Mayor Robert Wagner.
As Gelinas makes clear, although Robert Moses became the “face” of Lomex, the expressway was neither his idea nor a plan that he foisted upon elected officials. Rather, he was charged with implementing a plan that had initially garnered broad and deep support. The City Planning Commission approved the project in 1941 and again in 1960. Indeed, the expressway plan, largely because of the urgency of solving the acute, chronic traffic problem along Canal Street, survived for four decades until it was finally — and mercifully — put to death by Mayor John Lindsay, as he was running for re-election in 1969.
Few, if anyone, today mourn the loss of Lomex. And yet, the traffic congestion that the Lower Manhattan Expressway was expected to address remained unresolved. In fact, it got worse.
The demise of the Lower Manhattan Expressway has become the stuff of urban legend. The opposition to it was led by Jane Jacobs, and her success in killing the project enhanced her worldwide reputation as the spiritual leader for neighborhood-based planning. Indeed, the iconic New York City neighborhoods of SoHo, TriBeCa, Hudson Square and Nolita would be inconceivable if the 10-lane expressway over Canal Street, with its necessary entrance and exit ramps spreading across the area’s side streets like wings, had been built.
Today, few if any mourn the loss of Lomex. And yet, the traffic congestion that the Lower Manhattan Expressway would have addressed remains unresolved. In fact, it has gotten worse. As the number of automobile commuters from New Jersey and Staten Island entering Lower Manhattan increased, and as commercial vehicles found the most convenient route from New Jersey to Long Island was through the Holland Tunnel to the toll-free Williamsburg and Manhattan bridges, Canal Street became the traffic equivalent of the Maginot Line, although unlike the real Maginot Line, there was no way around it or through it when traveling to or from Lower Manhattan.
Given the Canal Street gridlock, it is no wonder that transportation planners, businesses and editorial boards continued to press for the ill-conceived Lower Manhattan Expressway for four decades. As Gelinas notes, over that time, the official cost of constructing the highway soared from $50 million to $250 million, with the unofficial cost perhaps as much as $500 million (in 1969 dollars!). Despite the ingenuity of traffic engineers, in the half century since the death of Lomex, no progress was made.
In January 2024, it took, on average, 11.2 minutes for a vehicle to traverse the less than one mile distance from the Manhattan Bridge to the Holland Tunnel during the evening rush hour — traveling, on average, about 5 mph. Beyond the inconvenience and long evening commute for those headed to New Jersey or Staten Island through the toll-free Holland Tunnel, and those headed to Brooklyn, Queens and Long Island over the toll-free Manhattan Bridge, Canal Street became an impenetrable barrier for cars, trucks and taxis for those headed north from Lower Manhattan or south to TriBeCa, the Financial District, Chinatown or Battery Park City.
Now, however, at long last, assuming congestion pricing continues, there is hope for Canal Street relief: During the first month since the implementation of the program, traffic speeds during the evening rush hour have improved significantly. Westbound traffic speeds along Canal have increased to almost 8 mph — or more than 30% faster. The average speed of eastbound traffic along the street has increased by almost 25%.
And, perhaps most importantly, the Maginot Line that blocked north and southbound traffic to and from Downtown (and which had created long traffic jams on both sides of Canal Street) has virtually disappeared. Traffic — for now — is flowing reasonably smoothly in all directions.
Rather than spend billions in 2025 dollars, destroying neighborhoods and preventing dynamic new ones from forming, an optimal result may well have been achieved by the new thinking of congestion pricing — putting the financial responsibility on those who benefit the most: the drivers who use Canal Street to get to where they need to go.
It is too early to know, of course, whether these striking improvements will hold up. But if they do, it will underscore how New York dodged a bullet in the defeat of the Lower Manhattan Expressway thanks to Jane Jacobs and her citizen army. It would be most unfortunate if, instead, Canal Street was put back on the firing line due to a premature termination of a promising program.