Why the Roosevelt Avenue surge won’t sustainably fix the Queens corridor’s public-safety problems
New York City's latest police crackdown on Roosevelt Avenue in Queens follows a familiar pattern: a surge of complaints, media attention and then a show of force promising to restore order. Nearly a month ago, city leaders announced “Operation Restore Roosevelt,” a 90-day “enforcement operation” targeting “prostitution, illegal brothels, unlicensed vendors and food carts, retail theft and the sale of stolen goods, and other quality-of-life offenses” in the corridor, which runs through Elmhurst, North Corona and Jackson Heights. The City touts the approach as being multifaceted. But, like crackdowns past, this operation seems to rely on reactionary tactics rather than any long-term strategy.
Two weeks after the announcement, local leaders and residents proposed their own plan to tackle the long-standing crime and quality-of-life issues on the avenue — one that urged the city to clean up the avenue less with zero tolerance enforcement and more with other strategies, partners and agencies. This unfunded proposal responded directly to gaps in the city’s approach. At the announcement, City Councilman Shekar Krishnan called for “consistent, steady and smart enforcement,” while Assemblywoman Catalina Cruz voiced residents’ concerns about the “misguided enforcement” behind the City’s efforts.
These community leaders felt compelled to step in because City Hall's approach, saturating troubled areas with a temporary infusion of resources, misses what this neighborhood actually needs.
Roosevelt Avenue has problems — big problems, some of which seem to have motivated those who live nearby to back Donald Trump, who promises law and order, in the November election — but what it needs is a sustained, thoughtful public safety strategy. This strategy needs enforcement that is consistent, sustained and focused on the right targets, all as part of a broader collaboration with the community.
Following the press, not the data
Operation Restore Roosevelt exemplifies how media attention, rather than crime data, often drives law enforcement priorities. While the initiative targets visible issues like unlicensed vending and prostitution, it overlooks the corridor's more serious violent crime problem. Between 74th and 111th Streets, robberies have surged 44% from last year and 141% since 2019, while assaults are up 46% and 118% respectively during those periods. This focus on visible quality-of-life offenses diverts resources from addressing the area's escalating violent crime problem.
These violent crimes follow clear patterns, clustering on specific blocks and spiking on weekend nights after bars close. Yet, instead of aligning resources to disrupt these patterns, the operation remains fixated on less critical concerns. This misalignment of priorities reflects a failure in strategic oversight, turning what could be an opportunity for proactive policing into another unchecked exercise in crisis management.
Perhaps it’s no surprise that almost one month into the operation, the numbers keep rising. Between the two precincts covering Roosevelt (the 110th and the 115th), robberies have risen 23% compared to the same 28-day period last year, and felony assaults were still up by 10% based on the latest CompStat data. The crackdown has yet to make a dent in violent crime.
When officers leave, problems return
As highly touted as the City’s operation is, it’s temporary — designed to last just 90 days. After that, if history holds, resources will move on to the next crisis. This short-term approach raises crucial questions. What happens when the surge ends? Will whatever allowed the problems to settle in on Roosevelt Avenue in the first place lead to their return?
These questions cut to the heart of basic policing strategy. "Accurate and Timely Intelligence," the first principle of CompStat, has nominally anchored the NYPD's data-driven management system since its introduction by crime strategist Jack Maple in the 1990s. When crime spikes, the City should notice. So when robberies and assaults began their steady surge in this area in August 2023, were precinct and department leaders aware of this trend? Another key CompStat principle is "Rapid Deployment of Resources." When the surge occurred, what did the police do about it? These are management questions.
A dirty secret is that, while crime was spiking along Roosevelt, local police staffing decreased. Public data shows that the number of officers in the two precincts steadily declined since the end of last year, and new academy recruits have not made up for the loss. The police department once had over 100 foot patrol officers walking this beat. Now there are 20.
Without addressing these staffing gaps, the cycle will repeat. The local precincts — already stretched thin — will again be tasked with combating violence and maintaining order on Roosevelt without the resources to hold any ground.
While crime was spiking along Roosevelt, the local police staffing decreased. Public data shows that the number of officers here steadily declined since the end of last year, and new academy recruits have not made up for the loss.
Crackdowns are blunt tools ill-suited for complex problems
Crackdowns are blunt instruments, ill-suited for tough, intractable problems. These problems call for careful work and finesse, not enforcement blitzes.
When agencies rush into a place they barely know, tasked with demonstrating “results,” they show success by the numbers — which translates into citations and arrests. Zero-tolerance doesn’t smartly separate the small offenses from the serious ones, and it often harms the very people it’s supposed to help. When residents watch their neighborhoods get blitzed with low-level enforcement while nearby areas get a lighter touch, trust in the system breaks. This is the opposite of precision policing. Are the officers distinguishing between those selling stolen goods on the sidewalk and those selling fruit?
Prior blitzes targeting brothels and street vendors haven’t worked. Brothels came back and the vendors returned, while street crime continued its rise.
Research shows that zero-tolerance policing doesn’t effectively reduce crime. A comprehensive review in Criminology and Public Policy examined 59 policing interventions and found that aggressive order-maintenance tactics barely impacted crime. In contrast, community-based problem-solving worked to reduce crime and disorder. Community-based problem solving involves police and community members collaborating to identify issues and develop tailored solutions. This approach focuses on building trust, partnering with local organizations and addressing specific challenges such as neglected infrastructure (e.g. waste baskets or lighting) or recurring crime patterns to create lasting improvements. These efforts require leadership at the local level.
Street prostitution is a good example of how the maladies run deeper than any quick fix can solve. It’s more visible on Roosevelt Avenue, but it’s been part of life across all five boroughs since New York began. This year, the NYPD tripled its nuisance abatement actions in just six months compared to all of last year. Even so, progress on Roosevelt has been slow. Complaints about brothels and street prostitution have persisted. This extra effort may help, but it needs to be steady and sustained beyond a three-month surge.
A 90-day surge might turn up leads that disrupt human trafficking, but truly breaking trafficking networks demands more — steady coordination across agencies, skilled investigative work and partnerships that reach across jurisdictions. Trafficking rings can be transnational. Genuine progress requires patient, methodical investigations driven by intelligence and collaboration, not short-term shows of force.
Zero-tolerance doesn’t smartly separate the small offenses from the serious ones, and it often harms the very people it’s supposed to help.
Similarly, street vending issues aren’t resolved through spurts of citations and seizures. Roosevelt Avenue's vendors have been a part of its streetscape for decades, drawing food lovers and adding to the neighborhood's character. The century-old tension between regulation and resistance in New York City has shown that quick bursts of enforcement don’t settle these conflicts. There’s also real political disagreement about how to handle street vending here.
Policing disorder requires mediation and problem-solving as much, if not more, than it requires enforcement. The fallout over a crackdown and sweep at Corona Plaza in July 2023 — when the city cleared out all vendors and confiscated their wares — made this clear. The Queens Borough president remarked “... the city has systematically failed our Corona Plaza street vendors for years,” questioning the sudden rush to act. A local task force of officials, agencies, community members and business leaders had already been working on solutions. It was their collaborative effort, not the sweep, that finally led to a workable compromise for the plaza.
Crackdowns impose indirect costs
Heavy-handed policing has backfired before. The city’s stop-and-frisk and zero-tolerance policies from over a decade ago showed how aggressive enforcement can break down community trust. When officers unfamiliar with neighborhoods enforce the law with little or no discretion, they often misread situations and alienate residents.
These tactics also carry hidden costs. Every extra officer on Roosevelt Avenue is one fewer officer on other assignments, creating gaps in detective work and neighborhood patrols. Similarly, when thousands of officers are deployed into the subway, which accounts for only a small fraction of the city's crime, they aren't tackling urgent issues above ground. Even if they are working overtime, it’s time away from other crime problems and it imposes other costs. In a city that demands so much of its public servants, these tradeoffs matter.
A role for crackdowns, when done right
This isn’t to say there’s no place for tactics like those being used along Roosevelt Avenue. A surge of officers in a concentrated area can bring a temporary drop in crime and disorder. The publicity around crackdowns can even create a deterrent effect, as fear of getting caught rises during the operation.
Recent reporting showed a drop in crime on a historically troubled block in New York City, where focusing on just one or two blocks led to a noticeable dip in criminal activity. City Hall pointed to six major crimes in the 28-day period ending this October 13, down from 14 incidents in the same period last year. Here, the enforcement was tightly targeted, planned and had strong, unambiguous political support. Yet a single 28-day period offers only a snapshot. Only time will tell if these gains are durable. The point is that crackdowns have to be part of a much bigger, smarter strategy; they are not a strategy in and of themselves.
A better way forward
True public safety requires more than short-term solutions. Real progress requires a steady presence, strong management, genuine partnerships with the community and coordinated action across agencies — with no arbitrary end date.
The first step forward here is rebuilding local capacity so that efforts can be sustained locally. Since 2018, the NYPD has lost more than 2,700 officers, leaving precinct staffing stretched thin. Precincts are the backbone of police work, and they need sustainable strengthening — not temporary reinforcements. This calls for rethinking the department’s organizational structure to get officers back to neighborhood patrols, where they’re needed most. Department brass cannot, and should not, be expected to micromanage the countless public safety challenges unfolding across the city.
This restructuring should empower local precincts to lead local initiatives. Their intimate knowledge of neighborhood dynamics and established relationships with community leaders make them, not headquarters staff, best positioned to coordinate responsive and relevant police work. Strengthening precinct-level autonomy will create more sustainable and effective community policing than deploying temporary, “fly-in” task forces.
But real safety goes beyond just policing. Community groups, social services and local organizations aren’t just extras; they’re essential to building safety. They deserve a seat at the planning table. This was a commitment made during Commissioner Bratton’s tenure shaped by hard-earned lessons from the 2000s. Neighborhoods shouldn’t need media attention to get support. They need well-staffed precincts, responsive agencies and partnerships that last.
Creating safe streets isn’t flashy. And, it does not entail periodic responses to mounting complaints. It requires the slow, hard work of prevention, building trust and solving problems block by block. Until New York City commits to this — with real resources, local leadership and strong community collaboration — places like Roosevelt Avenue will stay stuck in a cycle of crisis and inattention, watching their safety concerns return as surely as the last headline fades.